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Institutional Resilience Amid Political
Change: The Case of Biodiversity
Conservation
•
Paul F. Steinberg
One of the distinctive features of environmental protection as a political prob-
lem is the challenge that it poses for institutional design. Within political sci-
ence, considerable attention has been focused on the mismatch between the
geographic scope of environmental problems and the spatial jurisdiction of the
institutions responsible for their management. At the international level, for ex-
ample, transboundary pollution problems require novel forms of coordination
among sovereign nations in the absence of an international government,1 while
domestically cross-jurisdictional spillover effects have been the focus of innova-
tive policy efforts and related research on regional environmental management
and interagency cooperation.2 More generally, research on multi-level gover-
nance is motivated to a signiªcant degree by a recognition that environmental
problems require institutional responses that operate on multiple geographic
scales.3
Whereas spatial scales have received signiªcant attention from those con-
cerned with institutional design, comparatively little attention has been devoted
to the mismatch in temporal scales between the long-term requirements of en-
vironmental management and the short time horizons governing public and
private decisions affecting the environment. The literatures on institutional re-
silience and common property regimes,4 which have taken the lead in nudging
analysts to consider the longue durée, have been remarkably silent on questions
of politics, reducing questions of institutional design to the efªcient acquisition
of ecological knowledge, ºexible management in the face of uncertainty, and
the design of rules governing resource appropriation. These approaches over-
look essential components of environmental protection in practice, such as
power, social mobilization, and competing (and evolving) social values. Al-
though advocacy and mobilization are sometimes implied in these discussions,
1. Young 1994.
2. Margerum 2008; Johnson et al. 1999; and Thomas 2003.
3. Bulkeley 2005; and Young 2002.
4. Olsson et al. 2004; and Dietz et al. 2003.
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the political underpinnings of long-term environmental management remain
poorly understood.
This analysis aims to bring politics back into the institutional design equa-
tion, with a focus on the creation of resilient institutions for the long-term con-
servation of biological diversity.5 Biodiversity is an illuminating test case for
institutional responses to long-term policy problems because the natural pro-
cesses at risk (the survival of species and ecosystems) require very long-term so-
cial stewardship, the absence of which may produce irreversible losses in social
welfare, insofar as these biological resources are valued by society for their in-
herent worth and for the goods and services they provide. Moreover, while sur-
vey data show high levels of public concern over species loss in a wide range of
societies,6 in practice the political deck is often stacked against biodiversity con-
servation because the decisions governing land use and harvesting rates often
weigh concentrated short-term private costs against diffuse long-term public
goods.7 The cumulative result is that between 12 percent and 52 percent of spe-
cies within well-studied higher taxa worldwide are currently threatened with ex-
tinction.8 The stakes are high, the politics are uncertain, and the resources at risk
are highly vulnerable to social change, presenting serious challenges for institu-
tional design.
In the ªrst part of this article I contrast the long-term requirements
of biodiversity conservation with the pervasive changes in social conditions,
institutions, and political preferences that inºuence conservation outcomes.
I then introduce a new approach to biodiversity conservation—conservation
systems—that entails the deliberate design of a network of interlocking institu-
tions and associated political constituencies capable of providing a resilient
safety net to prevent irreversible declines in biodiversity at a given site. I argue
that the conservation systems approach offers valuable diagnostic and prescrip-
tive tools for the management of this long-term policy problem.
Conservation in the Face of Stochastic Social Change
Biodiversity conservation has been recognized as a legitimate policy priority at
the highest political levels, most notably by the 168 signatories to the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, which highlights the value of biodiversity as both a
source of ecosystem services and an inherently important part of our Earth’s nat-
ural heritage. In practice, however, biodiversity conservation poses a special
challenge for political institutions for at least three reasons. First, in contrast to
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5. Biological diversity, or biodiversity, refers to natural variety in ecosystems, species, and genes.
Biodiversity conservation denotes nature conservation with a special emphasis on preventing ir-
reparable harm to natural diversity through species extinction or the destruction of unique eco-
systems. For an overview see Steinberg 1998.
6. Dunlap et al. 1993.
7. Tobin 1990.
8. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005.
decision-making processes surrounding many environmental problems, short-
term changes in land use decisions and regulatory regimes can have irreparable
consequences due to the irreversibility of extinction. As a consequence, biodi-
versity conservation requires institutional responses that are not only long last-
ing but are capable of maintaining diligence against short-term reversals. Sec-
ond, in contrast to an issue like stratospheric ozone depletion, for which a small
number of chemicals are responsible for the harm, ecosystems and species are
vulnerable to a wide array of human activities. Even climate change, which re-
sults from diverse economic activities, is mediated through the impacts of a
small number of substances (notably carbon dioxide and methane) that can be
reduced in a relatively permanent sense through technological alternatives.
With biodiversity loss, in contrast, the problem is never truly “solved.”
While it is true that most major institutional innovations require a long-
term commitment, a third characteristic distinguishing biodiversity conserva-
tion from many policy issues is the extraordinarily long time horizon that one
must keep in mind, given the time scales intrinsic to ecological concerns. A sin-
gle sea turtle may require half a century just to reach sexual maturity; the assem-
blages of species found in relatively undisturbed ecosystems are the product of
evolutionary processes spanning millions of years.
The long-term requirements of biodiversity conservation stand in sharp
contrast to the scope and pace of social change in contemporary societies. Con-
servation institutions, when they endure, must do so in a context of pervasive
political, economic, and cultural change and associated institutional turnover.
Most of the world’s countries are variously prone to disruptions from rapid
economic growth, runaway inºation, economic collapse, wildly ºuctuating ex-
port earnings, ethnic conºict, civil wars, revolutions, coups, bureaucratic turn-
over and associated policy churning, and unprecedented rates of population
growth and urbanization.9 These phenomena occur alongside cross-national
trends such as democratization (which often produces highly unstable transi-
tional regimes), privatization, globalization, regional integration, new levels
and types of social mobilization, and decentralization of natural resource man-
agement, which has taken place in an estimated 60 developing countries.10 In
this context, conservation institutions must achieve what Clemens and Cook
call “reliable reproduction in the face of stochastic change.”11
Even in times of political stability, public support for policy goals can
ºuctuate wildly.12 The problem of consistent public support is especially acute
for biodiversity. On the one hand, few would advocate the disappearance of a
signiªcant swath of all forms of life on Earth, the permanent transformation of
rare landscapes and ecosystems, and the loss of the associated social value. Yet
as was noted earlier, because conservation typically provides diffuse long-term
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10. Ribot 2002.
11. Clemens and Cook 1999, 448.
12. Downs 1972.
public beneªts while imposing concentrated near-term costs on a few actors, it
is often difªcult to ensure a consistent response to defend the public interest in
this arena. Moreover, biodiversity is often poorly understood (most species have
not even been named), its value is difªcult to quantify and capture through
market mechanisms, and species habitats are often highly site-speciªc and
therefore susceptible to rapid destruction by a small number of actors.
In sum, efforts directed toward the long-term conservation of biological
diversity in the face of pervasive social change must contend with three unique
challenges: the irreversibility of extinction, which requires a robust safety net to
prevent irreparable harm; diverse and interacting threats to ecosystems, which
dictate against piecemeal approaches; and the tenuous nature of political sup-
port for conservation, which suggests that efforts to create resilient institutions
must take into account strategies for the mobilization of political constituen-
cies. This leaves us with two analytic tasks. The following section provides an
operational deªnition of institutional resilience founded on the idea of sustain-
ing a mission over time, and argues that research on common-pool resources
has paid inadequate attention to the normative and political dimensions of in-
stitutional effectiveness. The remainder of the article then describes how conser-
vation systems represent a practical, politically explicit planning approach for
the design of long-term institutional responses.
Creating Resilient Institutions
How can we create socially agreed-upon rules governing the long-term use
and conservation of biodiversity when ongoing change is one of the deªning
characteristics of modern society? A critical part of the answer concerns the
quality and characteristics of the institutions we design to address long-term
problems. Over the past decade, international environmental and development
organizations have taken a growing interest in the role of effective institutions
and governance in promoting sustainable development.13 There is a growing
recognition that the institutional rules of the game exercise a strong—and often
determinative—inºuence on the provision of public goods and the possibility
for achieving economic growth, poverty alleviation, civil society development,
sustainable resource extraction, and pollution reduction, among other social
goals.
The relationship between institutional design and long-term policy prob-
lems is not merely incidental because institutions are by deªnition oriented to-
ward the production of relatively durable patterns of social interaction. A crucial
part of the design task is to ensure enough adaptability to allow the institution
to retain its relevance and efªcacy in changing external environments. The sta-
bility and adaptability dimensions of institutional design are captured by the
concept of institutional resilience. Researchers associated with the Resilience Al-
liance have applied this idea broadly as a metaphor to describe the capacity of
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13. See for example World Bank 2003; and Akella and Cannon 2004.
social-ecological systems to “absorb shocks and still maintain function” in
“changing environments where the future is unpredictable and surprise is
likely.”14 For the present purpose, an institution is resilient to the extent that it
maintains its effectiveness over time despite changing external conditions. Effec-
tiveness denotes the extent to which the institution fulªlls the core mission
envisioned by its founders. An institutional arrangement may therefore demon-
strate resilience even if its speciªc rules, organizational components, and strate-
gies shift over time, so long as it continues to fulªll this mission. Likewise, an in-
stitutional arrangement may perish if its mission is fundamentally altered, even
if its operational machinery (procedures, budget, staff, infrastructure) persists.
This emphasis on sustaining a mission, or foundational norm—such as a
normative orientation toward the conservation of biological diversity—has re-
ceived insufªcient attention from political scientists studying institutional sta-
bility. In what is probably the most inºuential work by a political scientist on
the topic of long-term environmental management, Ostrom reviews numerous
case studies of communities that have crafted long-lasting local institutions for
sustainably managing resources such as water, forests, and ªsheries.15 On this
basis she devises a list of characteristics associated with durability, such as clear
rights of access to resource use, low-cost monitoring, graduated sanctions, con-
ºict resolution mechanisms, and venues for collective choice.16 A serious limita-
tion of this approach, however, is that it focuses entirely on the machinery of
longevity but not the principle to be sustained. Ostrom’s work is clearly moti-
vated in part by a concern for sustainability, but she only examines the factors
that caused these environmental institutions to last. Ostrom does not ask what
caused them to remain committed to sustainable resource use—why do some
long-lasting institutions continue to protect the environment, while others turn
their resilient capacities to other social goals, like the rapid liquidation of natu-
ral assets for the purpose of industrial expansion?
To sustain the normative commitment at the heart of an institution re-
quires a resilient social constituency advocating on behalf of that norm and its
associated institutional arrangements. Yet social mobilization is rarely featured
in the literature on common-pool resources. This may be a consequence of the
methodological individualism underpinning much of this literature, which re-
lies heavily on rational choice approaches to institutional analysis. One of the
great strengths of the approach is its synthesis of case material with systematic
analyses of the cost-beneªt calculations made by decision-makers subject to a
given set of resources and rules. What this leaves out is a fuller account of poli-
tics, one recognizing that individuals are not merely economic actors, that pref-
erences are socially constructed, and that institutions reºect, reinforce and/or
reorder power relations.17
Among the shortcomings of analyzing institutional resilience through a
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cost-beneªt lens, two stand out. First, this approach misses the diverse motiva-
tions underpinning pro-environment behavior. While it is certainly true that
price signals and economic sanctions and rewards shape behavior regarding the
environment, the value that people derive from nature comes also from aes-
thetic, educational, scientiªc, recreational, nationalistic, religious, and diverse
ethical considerations. This is true in poor societies as well as in wealthy ones.18
The mobilization of environmentalist Buddhist monks in Thailand, efforts to
protect scenic Victoria Harbor in Hong Kong, the March for Territory and Dig-
nity by indigenous peoples in the Bolivian Amazon—these realities beg for a
richer explanation of the social underpinnings of environmental behavior.
There are diverse constituencies for (and against) the environment as well as di-
verse motivations on the part of any given actor. Research on pro-environment
behavior within the private sector, for example, reveals that the farmers who
adopt organic agriculture are driven largely by their normative commitments to
environmental goals.19 Institutional design must be approached with these di-
verse motivations in mind, to avoid relying on a thin social constituency whose
motivation is purely ªnancial and to instead build a thick social safety net com-
prised of diverse conservation constituencies.
A second reason why we must move beyond an overly economistic inter-
pretation of environmental behavior is that this perspective ignores the role of
political mobilization in protecting the environment. It is axiomatic among
scholars and practitioners alike to assert that if we wish to change the activities
of resource users to provide public goods like standing forests, society must cre-
ate mechanisms to compensate them.20 But there are two dimensions to these
actors’ behavior. The ªrst is a change in economic behavior, such as the farmer
who leaves trees standing in response to a government incentive program. The
second component is the farmer’s role as a political actor. If a threat to the gov-
ernment program emerges, that person may well voice objections, organize,
advocate, and be heard. In Hirschman’s terms, these actors not only “exit”
environmentally destructive practices through their economic choices, but
also “voice” to support rules that they ªnd beneªcial for economic and/or other
reasons.21 The decision facing these decision-makers is not merely which
resources to exploit or rules to follow, but whether to advocate through politi-
cal channels for the survival of the institutional arrangement itself. The political
mobilization of rubber tappers in the Brazilian Amazon, of the Greenbelt
movement in Kenya, of US organic farmers in advocating rigorous labeling stan-
dards, and of Dupont Corporation in pushing for agreement on the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, are telling in this regard.
By focusing greater analytic attention on the political characteristics of these so-
called “economic actors”—their behavior, identities, resources, strategies, and
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opportunities—we not only arrive at a richer understanding of environmental
politics in practice, but can devise new criteria for institutional design, imple-
menting measures that will attract a mix of constituencies likely to be politically
inºuential over the long haul.
Building on this perspective, in the next section I describe a politically ex-
plicit analytic approach that can be used to diagnose the resilience of conserva-
tion institutions and to highlight opportunities for institutional strengthening.
Designing Conservation Systems
Environmental managers have long advocated more comprehensive approaches
to protecting biodiversity22 but there has emerged little guidance on how to put
such a perspective into practice. Here I propose a new approach—conservation
systems—as a potentially powerful method for doing so, focusing on criteria for
ensuring institutional resilience to guard against irreversible losses of biodivers-
ity over long time horizons. A conservation system is a constellation of actors,
organizations, and regulations oriented toward the protection of valued biolog-
ical resources at a particular site. These biological resources could be as speciªc
as a local population of a rare species, or could include a representative example
of a regionally disappearing plant community, or comprise an entire forest,
coral reef, or otherwise biologically important landscape that is valued for any
number of reasons, from the provision of fuel wood to respite for urban dwell-
ers, the protection of watersheds, ªsh and game habitat, scenic vistas, recreation,
research and education, or other values.
The term “system” as used here corresponds to Rogers’ deªnition of a so-
cial system as “a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solv-
ing to accomplish a common goal.”23 In practice, a core group of conservation
proponents would bring together potentially interested parties, agree on the val-
ued biological resources of concern, and engage in a collective diagnostic and
planning exercise. As a diagnostic tool, the conservation systems approach of-
fers environmental planners and concerned citizens a methodology to systemat-
ically assess the existing, de facto safety net—the regulatory structures, organiza-
tions, and constituencies likely to act on behalf of these resources—and
analyzes its likely resilience in the face of future political and economic disrup-
tions. Conservation systems thus respond to Robert Lempert’s call for “strategies
that are robust in the face of an unpredictable future.”24 As a planning tool, this
approach encourages conservation proponents to explicitly design such a sys-
tem, ªlling gaps and reaching out to diverse constituencies, thereby deepening
social understanding of, and support for conservation.
As a proposal for a novel approach to conservation planning, the discus-
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sion to follow is necessarily speculative. Its realism derives from the fact that
many of the components of conservation systems are already in place. There are
innumerable efforts underway around the world at collaborative management
of regional and local landscapes that involve diverse stakeholders at different
levels of governance in joint problem solving. Sometimes these are at the insti-
gation of national regulatory agencies, as with India’s Joint Forestry Program
or the US National Estuary Program. Other times they are regional initiatives
such as Natural Communities Conservation Planning in Southern California or
the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. International organizations such as
UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Program devote considerable resources to
community-based collaborative conservation planning, as do NGOs such as
the Worldwide Fund for Nature. The proliferation of groups focused on regional
watershed management, collaborative rangeland management, community-
based coastal management, and similar arrangements across a wide range of
policy areas has spawned a large research literature in public administration
tracking their characteristics, prerequisites, and effects.25 These arrangements all
entail cooperation among diverse stakeholders in place-based decision-making
and planning processes. So there is ample precedent for collaborative conserva-
tion planning, and indeed conservation systems would often be incorporated
into ongoing planning processes and existing collaborative networks.
The distinctive feature of the conservation systems approach is its focus on
long-term resilience in the face of change, and its explicit emphasis on constitu-
ency building and political advocacy. Conservation systems should be designed
to withstand short-term perturbations such as inºation, recessions, boom-and-
bust cycles associated with particular industries, institutional instability, politi-
cal crises, and variation in the priorities and capabilities of conservation advo-
cates. To achieve the necessary resilience, conservation systems should include
constituencies at multiple scales (local, regional, national, and where possible
international) and across multiple political parties, and should build support
within diverse sectors of society for which ºuctuations in support are unlikely to
move in tandem.
Before describing these design criteria in greater detail, two clariªcations
are in order. First, the conservation systems approach does not assume or re-
quire the mobilization of all relevant actors along these various axes of diversity.
The goal is to more effectively coordinate the activities of those already sympa-
thetic to the conservation of the biological resources in question, and to in-
crease awareness of and support for this goal in the broader community. Nor
does this approach, with its single-minded focus on biodiversity, presume that
these actors will (or indeed should) seek to promote conservation above all
other social goals in all places. Conservation systems should be designed with
respect to speciªc resources with high conservation value, not the landscape as a
whole. Moreover, the most serious threats to biodiversity seldom result from
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projects that are vital to human welfare or economic development and for
which no plausible project alternatives exist. An effectively organized conserva-
tion system can serve a “stop and think” function equivalent to environmental
impact assessment, promoting public deliberation among diverse interests and
preventing premature closure on a decision that could be improved with more
careful consideration of the long-lasting environmental consequences. A con-
servation system can coordinate public education and policy advocacy and can
improve compliance with existing environmental regulations.
Diversity across Scales
A resilient conservation system is one that can withstand social change without
irreparable harm to the biological resources it is designed to protect. An impor-
tant design criterion, therefore, involves the creation of constituencies at multi-
ple levels of governance. In other words, the spatial design considerations high-
lighted at the outset of this article reappear in the service of temporal
management.
It has been widely noted in the literature that when protected areas are es-
tablished in a manner that disregards or even disenfranchises local constituen-
cies, they can become a source of ªerce contention, compromising both conser-
vation and development goals.26 Unlike many other types of long-term policy
challenges, such as central banking or pension administration, the site-speciªc
nature of biological diversity requires support from innumerable local commu-
nities. In California, for example, the majority of rare and endangered plant spe-
cies occur in only one or two local counties and nowhere else, meaning that one
local community with practices unfavorable to conservation can cause a species
to permanently disappear from the stock of global biological diversity.27 More-
over, if political change at the national level puts in place ofªcials who are un-
sympathetic to conservation goals, it is wise to have a strong local constituency
whose support can serve as a buffer against irreversible damage from short-
sighted decisions by national policy-makers.28
There are many proven methods for thickening a social safety net in sup-
port of biodiversity to include local constituencies. The approaches are diverse
and depend on local conditions, but examples include grassroots campaigns to
build local awareness of endangered species, such as the successful campaign to
protect the St. Lucia Parrot using a social marketing methodology subsequently
replicated in dozens of developing countries;29 locally initiated protected areas,
such as Gran Chaco National Park in Bolivia; community development projects
that rely on intact ecosystems, such as the marketing of non-timber forest prod-
ucts; payment for ecosystem services, such as the Costa Rican program that pays
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farmers to leave trees on their property; and trail building and nature interpreta-
tion to encourage local awareness of spectacular landscapes.
Conversely, any strategy relying exclusively on local support runs the risk
that a change in local leadership, economic conditions, or short-term prefer-
ences will lead to destruction of the resource. Although an overwhelming ma-
jority of citizens may express a genuine concern for habitat conservation, they
may act quite differently when faced with the possibility of foregoing tangible
local beneªts for the sake of one or a small number of species. From a local per-
spective it often appears that signiªcant beneªts (timber revenues, industrial ex-
pansion, new housing, recreational opportunities) are sacriªced for the beneªt
of an obscure desert ºower or small ªsh; meanwhile, from a bird’s eye view, so-
cial value is depleted ºower by ºower, animal by animal, across the planetary
landscape, leading to a situation that deviates sharply from public preferences.
It is at the local level that this “tyranny of small decisions”30 is felt most forcibly;
not surprisingly, even strong advocates for democratic decentralization of natu-
ral resource management, such as Ribot, recommend that national authorities
establish baselines to ensure environmental protection.31 Resilient conservation
systems must therefore include national-level constituencies and institutions
that are buffered from short-term cost calculations at the local level.
A useful (and still underutilized) technique for building political support
among high-ranking politicians at the national level was pioneered by Thomas
Lovejoy of the Smithsonian Institution and has been developed more systemati-
cally by the Organization for Tropical Studies. With this approach, inºuential
decision-makers are selectively invited to nature retreats that include lectures
from environmental experts, ªeld trips, and open-ended discussions of natural
resource policy and management.32 When implemented in an open manner
that encourages discussion and debate, this model has proven to be an effective
tool for building an interest in conservation among political sovereigns.33
Between the local and national levels, state or provincial constituencies
can add yet another voice to ensure that short-term changes at one level of gov-
ernance do not result in irreversible losses in biological diversity. Examples in-
clude Brazil’s Ecological Goods and Services Tax, adopted by nine Brazilian
states to encourage biodiversity conservation at the municipal level. In some
cases it is also possible to attract signiªcant attention at the international level,
lending yet another layer of resilience to a conservation system. International
constituencies can play an important stabilizing role because their support is
buffered from many of the social disruptions affecting domestic components of
the system, such as runaway inºation or a crackdown on autonomous social or-
ganizations. Examples include the emergency response unit of the World Con-
servation Monitoring Centre, UNESCO’s emergency assistance for World Heri-
tage properties, and a range of initiatives by The Nature Conservancy to provide
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funds for ailing protected areas systems. International constituencies can be
brought into the conservation system through purchasing contracts (e.g. phar-
maceutical prospecting agreements or international markets for shade-grown
coffee), climate change mitigation projects, educational exchanges, research col-
laborations, tourism, designations of globally signiªcant areas, and NGO proj-
ect support.
Notwithstanding the beneªts of multi-level coordination, these efforts can
be difªcult to initiate and sustain because professional and cultural norms and
routines lead conservation advocates to specialize in one or another level of
governance. There are, however, special categories of individuals comfortable
operating at more than one level of governance. Advocates bridging domestic
and international policy arenas34 or navigating from local to national levels35
can facilitate coordination across levels of the conservation system. This bridg-
ing function may be institutionalized in formal “boundary organizations” that
take the form of “task forces, design teams, rule-making bodies, coordinating
committees, study commission[s], centers, networks, and other similar entities
that are charged with reºecting diverse information and intelligence in the ser-
vice of some task or action that is not possible for one actor or perspective to
perform alone.”36
Support from Multiple Political Parties
To ensure a resilient social constituency for conservation, it is essential to culti-
vate sympathetic contacts in diverse political parties. In the course of interviews
with environmental policy reformers from dozens of developing countries over
the past decade, I have observed a strong tendency to shun multi-partisanship.
However, concentrating one’s hopes, resources, and personal contacts in a single
political party carries signiªcant risks. In societies characterized by rapid politi-
cal turnover, partisan environmentalism produces a series of ªts and starts for
conservation that lack the long-term support across diverse political administra-
tions—governance across governments—that is needed for cumulative institu-
tion building.37 If instead conservation proponents cultivate contacts in diverse
political parties, this increases the number of access points to elected bodies
such as legislatures and city councils and hedges political bets in the face of un-
predictable changes in political administrations. Costa Rica’s institutional suc-
cesses in biodiversity conservation owe much to the fact that the country’s envi-
ronmental reformers have gone to great lengths to cultivate ties in both major
political parties, and there are important strategic alliances among top-ranking
environmental ofªcials across the two parties.38
What techniques exist for building multi-party coalitions in support of
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conservation? This important question has not managed to attract systematic at-
tention from political scientists beyond analyses of the strategic dilemmas fac-
ing green parties.39 Indeed, the role of political parties in environmental policy-
making has not, to my knowledge, been studied systematically in any develop-
ing country. Anecdotally, however, there are some promising ªndings. The use
of conservation education retreats for high-ranking ofªcials, described earlier,
has produced important multi-party collaborations in Latin America. In Costa
Rica, one such retreat resulted in a successful effort to amend the national con-
stitution to guarantee every citizen’s right to a healthy environment. Bolivian
policy reformers closely studied the methodology used in Costa Rica and orga-
nized a retreat for lawmakers to showcase community-based sustainable for-
estry projects, building multi-partisan support for one of the world’s most pro-
gressive sustainable forestry laws in 1996.40 Lower-proªle initiatives to build
support across the political spectrum could include deliberately stafªng the gov-
erning boards of conservation organizations with dedicated members from di-
verse political parties, and using political afªliation as one criterion for deciding
which local communities to include in a pilot project.
Diversity across Social Sectors
To ensure that a conservation system can endure in a context of social change re-
quires the cultivation of constituencies from diverse sectors of society. Relevant
axes of sectoral diversity include nonstate versus government actors, private sec-
tor versus nonproªt organizations, and diverse categories of market activities,
such that income streams from conservation-related activities are unlikely to re-
spond equally to a given shift in economic conditions. Sectoral diversity can
serve as one criterion for the type of projects pursued in connection with a pro-
tected area, as conservation system proponents identify missing categories of so-
cial constituencies and pursue projects that will attract their participation. Simi-
lar considerations can guide decisions regarding the focus of public education
and outreach efforts.
A social constituency for biodiversity is especially important because civil
society organizations are often key components in the institutional network re-
sponsible for protecting species and ecosystems and their associated social
beneªts. Civil society organizations play a leading role in a wide range of con-
servation activities such as land purchases, legal advocacy, education, operation
of nature reserves, tourism, wildlife population monitoring and database man-
agement, and passage of local open space ordinances.41 Collaborations between
government conservation agencies and civil society organizations are common-
place around the globe, and the effectiveness of conservation policies relies to a
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signiªcant degree on civic engagement.42 For biodiversity, as with many other
environmental issues, “policy” is not so much a government activity as it is a
course of social action in which government plays a central role. Resilient con-
servation institutions thus require resilient social constituencies.
Creating interest on the part of both civil society and governmental actors
increases the odds that the inevitable ºuctuations of interest or engagement by
one sector may be tempered by the other. Thus a national park beneªts from
having civil society constituencies who can publicly promote the park’s goals
and, in the event of threats to the park, can mobilize the public to bolster the
position of conservation ofªcials vis-à-vis their opponents. Conversely, bolster-
ing nongovernmental conservation efforts through constructive government
involvement—such as tax incentives for nonproªt organizations, public disclo-
sure programs to make environmental information available to communities
and NGOs, or programs granting formal management roles to community-
based organizations—gives biodiversity much stronger backing than civil soci-
ety organizations can provide unaided.43
Financial incentives for conservation have received a great deal of atten-
tion from scholars and practitioners alike, but a conservation system dependent
on market incentives alone is highly susceptible to the vacillations of the econ-
omy. Changes in ªnancial fortunes can lead to the collapse of income-generat-
ing projects designed to promote conservation, as has been documented in
Peru44 and as occurred with nature tourism in East Africa following the 1998 US
embassy bombings.45 To guard against the vagaries of market conditions, a con-
servation system should bring together a diverse portfolio of ªnancial interests
including, where appropriate, combinations of tourism, hunting and ªshing,
private concessionaires providing services in protected areas, certiªed timber
operations, harvesters of non-timber forest products, carbon mitigation pro-
jects, and other sectors whose incentives for conservation are unlikely to re-
spond equally to a given economic disruption. It is also important to build non-
economic constituencies that can be mobilized in support of conservation and
whose motivation to speak out on behalf of these resources is decoupled from
market trends. Toward this end, system proponents can link protected areas
with municipal water systems, institutionalize educational programs involving
site visits by schools, create opportunities for scientiªc ªeld research, and en-
courage involvement by local religious organizations, which have been an im-
portant voice for conservation in many countries.46
Diversity is also an appropriate criterion for the conservation organiza-
tions involved, to ensure that the system is not overly susceptible to the fate of a
particular organization or charismatic leader. It is also worth involving diverse
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government agencies within each level of governance. Although one must be
careful to clearly delineate responsibilities among agencies, it is often feasible to
involve a water agency, electric power authorities, ministries of tourism and
planning, and others that can constitute a more effective political force than can
agencies with an exclusive focus on conservation alone. This must be balanced
against the potential disadvantages of involving agencies with mandates only
partially compatible with the foundational mission of a conservation system.
But multi-agency coordination under a lead agency is a common practice in
public sector management of problems like disaster response, child protective
services, and foreign policy-making, and is consistent with the trend toward
strategic environmental assessment aimed at mainstreaming environmental
concerns across diverse government agencies.
Testing for Resilience
As a diagnostic exercise, the resilience of the conservation system can be approx-
imated, and gaps in its protective capacity identiªed, by arranging meetings
with knowledgeable participants who consider a series of hypothetical scenarios
that could potentially cause irreversible harm to the resource. Practical method-
ologies for the conduct of such thought experiments are provided by Wollen-
berg and by Peterson and colleagues.47 Typically taking the form of “what if”
questions, potential points of exploration include:
• What if local planners are approached by a well-ªnanced company pro-
posing a project that would signiªcantly harm the resource?
• What if a key piece of national conservation legislation is amended or re-
pealed?
• What if there is a shift in the ruling political party at the local, regional, or
national levels?
• What if the tourism market crashes? What if there is a prolonged reces-
sion, runaway inºation, or some other disruptive economic development?
• What if a leading local conservation organization were to fold, or if a tire-
less local conservation leader were no longer available?
• What if the current, principal threat to the resource were mitigated? Are
there other threats that might arise in its place?
• What would happen in the event of political instability or widespread civil
disruption?
If questions are based on a diverse set of scenarios that are plausible (even
at a low probability) given local conditions, the resulting discussion will likely
reveal missing components of the system as it stands. During the early stages of
design, many de facto “systems” may be remarkably thin—consisting of little
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more than a private reserve, a regulatory agency lacking a local social constitu-
ency, or a small and committed organization with shaky organizational founda-
tions. These thought experiments are likely to highlight potential weaknesses,
even in systems that participants initially considered fairly robust.
Once weaknesses are identiªed, the prescriptive stage of the exercise
requires adding layers of institutional protection and expanding constituen-
cies through a combination of project design, outreach, coalition building, and
other approaches, drawing on participant knowledge of local conditions. To the
extent that the mitigation of potential weaknesses requires signiªcant commit-
ments of resources, judgment must be exercised in deciding whether and how
to mitigate various risks. The perceived likelihood of a given scenario, as well as
its potential for disruption, should enter into participant calculations.
Participation and Coordination
All of these strategies for thickening the social safety net for biodiversity raise
important questions about the feasibility of collective action. However desirable
such broad-based coalitions might be from the perspective of resilience, is this
achievable given what we know of social coordination problems? To address
this question, it is important to note that the degree of additional collaboration
implied by a conservation system will vary considerably. In some cases, there
may already exist a multi-stakeholder organization that undergoes the evalua-
tive exercise described above and decides to diversify its activities, reaching out
to underrepresented political constituencies or advocating for new policies at
one or another level of governance. In other cases, the evaluation may inspire
the creation of a deliberative body where none existed before. Hence the extent
of new collective action, and the associated cost of thickening the constituency
for conservation, will vary considerably from case to case. Nevertheless it is im-
portant to ask: What incentives do actors have to participate in a conservation
system?
The key convening players in such a system will be those whose normative
orientation (often embedded in organizational missions) is highly congruous
with that of the system mission, or whose material interests are closely tied to
the well-being of the valued biological resources it is designed to protect, such
as ªshing communities whose livelihood is affected by a declining coral reef.
But many potentially important constituencies do not fall within this category.
Therefore the creation of a conservation system requires what Wijen and Ansari
refer to as “collective institutional entrepreneurship.” In contrast to cases of in-
stitutional change spearheaded by relatively few entrepreneurs, collective insti-
tutional entrepreneurship entails “the process of overcoming collective action
and achieving sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors to cre-
ate new institutions or transform existing ones.”48 These authors note that col-
laboration can be promoted by manipulating power conªgurations (through
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the creation of new alliances or passage of legislation that requires private-sector
actors to seek out solutions to social problems), devising incentive structures, or
inducing cooperation by framing the issue in terms of mutual identities and in-
terests regarding consensual social norms.
A wide range of incentive structures are available to those looking to bring
new constituencies into a conservation system. Examples include sharing infor-
mation with private sector actors (thereby lowering transaction costs) regarding
certiªcation programs, climate mitigation projects, and other arrangements that
generate income for those providing ecosystem services, and encouraging their
participation in projects funded by governments and international donors.
Schneider and colleagues, noting the considerable transaction costs of “devel-
oping networks in complex, fragmented, adversarial policy arenas,” ªnd that
relatively modest amounts of ªnancial and logistical support from a central gov-
ernment program, together with a public participation requirement to qualify
for monetary resources, is correlated empirically with stronger local conserva-
tion networks.49 The broader information function of conservation systems is
crucial, and indeed natural resource agency personnel in the United States re-
port that knowledge expansion is among the most valuable beneªts that they re-
ceive from participation in multi-stakeholder collaborative networks.50 The
reputational beneªts of participation are another potentially important incen-
tive for private sector and governmental actors. Researchers at the World Bank
have provided extensive documentation of the importance of community pres-
sure in improving the environmental practices of ªrms throughout the develop-
ing world,51 while Tsai reports that local ofªcials in rural China are more likely
to provide environmental public goods when subject to community pressure
bearing on these ofªcials’ moral standing in the community.52
In a recent review of cross-sector collaborations, Selsky and Parker report
that the motivations for participation in these partnerships are diverse. Organi-
zations may collaborate to achieve resources and competencies they cannot
achieve on their own, with a primary interest in maximizing their own organiza-
tional interests and preserving autonomy. Alternatively, they may come together
either voluntarily or by mandate to address larger social issues or “meta-
problems” “that exceed the scope of single organizations . . . and tend to fall
through the cracks of prevailing institutional arrangements.”53 Participation in
these partnerships allows stakeholders to exert an inºuence on the outcome.
A signiªcant organizational literature has arisen to identify factors that en-
able or constrain partnerships across sectors. A review of these ªndings is well
beyond the scope of this article, but key challenges include the distinct motiva-
tions of private and nonproªt organizations, the establishment of trust, skilled
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facilitation by conveners, the power and autonomy of the nonproªt sector ver-
sus other participants, and the ways in which each sector’s external stakeholders
(stockholders, agency directors, social constituencies, etc.) encourage or dis-
courage their participation in such partnerships. This literature ªnds that suc-
cess is possible under a variety of governance structures.
Because conservation systems are complex social arrangements designed
to achieve speciªc goals, a core group should assume responsibility for system-
wide coordination to ensure that the valued biological resources are well served
by the system as a whole. This coordination function is essential because many
of the institutional roles in the system will be ªlled by actors with only a mar-
ginal interest in biodiversity conservation—such as politicians with diverse con-
stituencies, water agencies, ªrms for which habitat protection is merely a means
to proªt, and even environmental scientists, many of whom would rather study
ecosystem processes than track the latest political developments bearing on an
ecosystem’s future. This coordinating entity would play a role similar to that of a
caseworker in social services, a designated patient advocate in a hospital setting,
or a coordination team in emergency response systems. In each case these enti-
ties are responsible for a holistic, mission-centered perspective to ensure that
the diverse parts of the system are serving their intended function. In a conserva-
tion system this role could be played by a council with representation from key
participants in the system who, regardless of their organizational afªliation,
serve in a capacity in which the priority consideration is the welfare of the val-
ued biological resources at the heart of the system.
Conclusion: Institutional Design as if Politics Mattered
Political mobilization and institutional design are often cast as distinct phe-
nomena, the province, respectively, of activists and administrators working in
their separate spheres. Friedmann rightly identiªes technocratic and social mo-
bilization perspectives as two distinct intellectual threads in the development of
planning and policy theory.54 Yet we also know that institutions selectively mo-
bilize and demobilize social constituencies, distributing and redistributing not
only economic resources but also access to decision-making channels, and that
social reformers are well aware of this when pursuing their political aims.
When thinking about long-term policy problems, the challenge is to create
institutions that mobilize a bias for social well being on time scales that far ex-
ceed the day-to-day calculus of people going about their daily lives. Although
biodiversity conservation pushes this challenge to an extreme, the foregoing
analysis of conservation systems speaks to a larger question that runs across en-
vironmental research and practice—why, and under what conditions do people
organize to pursue environmental ends, and what role can and do institutions
play in this process? As I hope this article demonstrates, to answer this question
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requires that we expand our set of behavioral assumptions at the point of ana-
lytic departure—exploring not only economic motivations but the fuller set of
drivers that move individuals toward or away from sustainable activities, and
the broader set of institutional venues (markets, polling places, families, village
meetings, churches, political parties, etc.) through which these motives translate
into collective action.
It is striking that the literature on institutional resilience and adaptive
management has paid so little attention to political mobilization, especially
given that political analysis is a mainstay of scholarship on public manage-
ment.55 There is a need for research that explores more systematically the rela-
tionship between political mobilization and institutional design. As a prescrip-
tive exercise, this requires remaining in close conversation with knowledgeable
practitioners navigating these very difªcult issues on the ground. As an analytic
undertaking, it requires mining the fuller institutional tradition, beyond ratio-
nal actor approaches (and their very considerable contributions) to consider
how social rules might constructively channel and reºect the diverse social con-
cerns and capacities bearing on environmental outcomes. We need a clearer un-
derstanding of the political underpinnings of resilient environmental institu-
tions, and this is a niche that political science can ªll.
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